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Although the right to strike is increasingly “populated” by rulings issued by the 
“international courts” (European Court of Justice; European Court of Human Rights) 
and doctrinally wielded with passion, particularly in the “Continent”, there might be 
some reasons to think and affirm that the “Thatcherite” legacy of the immunity from the 
strike “made in Britain”, enshrined in the relevant 1992 statute and left basically 
untouched in the ensuing “Blairite” era, is still both valid domestically and viable as a 
paradigm for legislations across the Channel.  
It is déjà vu to read among British scholars that the model of the TULR(C)A is too 
rigid, particularly in looking at some detailed procedures (eg balloting) which are 
required to be complied with, for the strike to be legitimately acted upon. However, as 
this legal analysis of a comparative nature manages hopefully to corroborate, an 
alternate model of industrial action, particularly the Italian sciopero (strike), inspired to 
a totally different philosophy (loose legislation and therefore ample power conferred on 
trade unions) and affected by so many legislative inconsistencies, might suggest the 
opposite, particularly in light of the serious problems of industrial productivity affecting 
that country. The British entrenched approach to industrial action, if looked at from this 
perspective and despite some recent judicial blunders (the “Metrobus” case), may well 
be a “family jewel” not to nonchalantly dismiss as, save for some minor flaws which are 






In light of the current financial climate, the resultant economic landscape could well 
constitute a fertile backdrop against which to pose the question whether the right to 
strike is the most persuasive and effective means of safeguarding employees’ rights or, 
conversely, whether “softer tools” to the benefit of employees could be envisaged at 
legislative level, in order to reconcile the rights of employees on one hand with those of 
businesses on the other.   
The quintessential purpose of this work then is to analyse whether the legislative avenue 
in the matter of industrial action in Britain, “historically” hinged upon the TULR(C)A 
19921, remains relevant despite the passing of time, or if a revamp is needed in the wake 
of an inclement financial and economic turn of events.  
To this end, the current work revises, by way of comparative analysis, a foreign 
legislation (the Italian one) where the approach adopted in launching strike action stands 
in stark contrast to the British one. In brief, and without disclosing the major findings of 
this discussion as revealed in the conclusions, the Italian approach is based, on the one 
hand, on a wide-ranging and comprehensive concept of protected trade dispute, de facto 
encompassing also the pure political one and, on the other, on a discretionary power 
conferred on trade unions in calling the industrial action. These two main features, 
coupled with the rather regressive form of “democracy” prevailing within the Italian 
trade union movement (a certification for the trade union to be officially recognised is 
                                                 
1 Trade Union and Labour Relations Consolidation Act 1992, henceforth also the "TULR(C)A. 
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still missing in that country)2 are questioned in this work as aspects, inter alia, 
contributing to the current financial instability gripping the Italian economy. In addition, 
a “cautionary tale” may lie therein, sounding an advance warning to Britain should it, 
for some reason, depart in future from the traditional “spirit” to which its system of 
industrial action is aligned. 
The outcome of this discussion shall undoubtedly elicit interest and surprise in equal 
measure, as the present work essentially succeeds in corroborating the view that not 
only is the framework of industrial action in Britain, as enshrined in the TULR(C)A, 
still valid, despite some arguable rulings more recently adopted at judicial level, but also 
it represents a set of provisions ripe for “exportation”, mutatis mutandis, to the 
Continent. This is particularly the case in countries afflicted by problems of 
competitiveness – such as Italy – in order to engender a more fair and modern system of 
industrial relations, respectful in a balanced way of the rights of employees and 
employers alike.  
In a comparative analysis between two jurisdictions both belonging to the EU, reference 
shall be made, needless to say, also to the most recent decisions of the international 
courts, particularly the European Court of Justice and, therefore, the controversial, 
contrasting stances of that judicial body, as regards the existence itself of a right to take 
industrial action within the most recent legislation adopted in Brussels3.  
 
 
The concept of “strike” in Britain: traditional common law 
approach 
 
At a doctrinal level, with particular reference to the “Anglo-Saxon world”, the 
possibility itself to deem the right to strike a fundamental right of the individual or even 
a right to be safeguarded has been in some cases disputed4. However, prevailing opinion 
appears for the moment – at least “quantitatively” – to be blowing in the polar direction 
with the right to strike steeped in a logic which dictates that the balance of power, 
undeniably tipped in favour of employers with regard to firing their employees, should 
be offset exclusively by a power harnessed by the workers to act in concert, thereby 
enacting a strike.5 Secondly, the industrial action must be seen to be an integral cog in 
the collective bargaining process, thus rendering it irrefutable once the latter has been 
conceptually recognised6. Lastly, from a more empirical perspective, the right to strike, 
                                                 
2 Despite the provisions of the Italian Constitution (art. 39, particularly paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, no 
legislation has never been in order to get the Italian trade unions officially recognised. Among the several 
commentaries to this Italian peculiarity, see G Ghezzi and U Romagnoli, Il Diritto Sindacale (Zanichelli 
1997); G Giugni, Diritto Sindacale (Cacucci 2001); G Pera, Libertà Sindacale, Diritto Vigente, in 
Enciclopedia del Diritto, XXIV (Giuffre’ Editore 1974) 494 534, particularly 501; from a comparative 
point of view, S Sciarra, ‘La Libertà Sindacale nell'Europa Sociale’ 1990 Giornale di Diritto del Lavoro e 
delle Relazioni Industriali 653,686. 
3 See particularly the following Chapter 2 below.   
4 O Kahn-Freund & B A Hepple, Laws against Strikes (Fabian Research Series 302, London 1972) 4. The 
substance of this school of thought as well as the opposite one, particularly that of Ben-Israel, is discussed 
and analysed in depth in S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law (5th edn Hart Publishing 2009) 890, 891, 
and hinted in this work in Chapter 2 and 3 infra.  
5 C Grunfeld, Modern Trade Union Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1966) passim. 
6 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1942] AC 435,463, particularly the dictum of Lord 
Wright. 
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taken as a fundamental human right, unsurprisingly finds little support in countries 
lacking democracy – a scenario which tends to imply that, a contrario, it should be 
acknowledged in modern democracies7. 
Yet, despite the enthusiasm of the many and the apathy of the few, caution should be 
exercised8 as such a right is prescribed exclusively in international treaties relating to 
socio-economic matters, rather than in matters of a civil or political nature; a caveat 
which may be perceived, albeit optimistically, as a possibility for the state to set forth 
procedural limits, rather than limitations of a substantive law nature9.  
Said of the conceptual debate surrounding this area of law trans-nationally and turning 
to the ius positum, it is well known that Britain, unlike most other European countries10, 
has no right to strike duly legislated. The strike itself remains officially prohibited at 
common law as there is a duty for employees to complete work given to them by their 
respective employers11. As a result of the unequivocal rigor of this stance, a breach of 
contract will inevitably result in cases where an employee decides to go on strike rather 
than fulfil his contractual obligations12.  
As if to further compound matters, the international “frameworks”, vested with the 
powers to instigate changes which permeate through to the domestic courts, do not offer 
great support for an opposing theory to be corroborated. 
In fact, with regard to the EU legislation firstly, the same decisum in “Viking” adopted 
by the European Court of Justice13 might tenuously and vaguely suggest, on the one 
hand, that the different jurisdictions in Britain should somehow recognise a right to 
“strike”, albeit exclusively in matters of EU relevance and competence14. On the other 
hand, it is also practically conceded, in a doctrinal sense, that this dictum, if analysed in 
                                                 
7 Eg The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights guarantees the right to strike, 
so long as “it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country”. 
8 S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law (5th edn n 4) 890,891. 
9 R Ben-Israel, International Labour Standards: The Case of Freedom to Strike (Kluwer 1988) 82. 
10 For instance, in the Italian legislation, the "comparator" adopted for the purposes of this analysis, 
scholars (A Vallebona, Istituzioni di Diritto del Lavoro vol I Il Diritto Sindacale (7th edn CEDAM 2010) 
250) take for granted that the right to strike is a discretionary right (diritto potestativo) conferred on each 
employee. 
In the same jurisdiction, it is emphasised that the combined reading of an "ordinary" right to strike, as 
above defined, and some principles existing in the same constitution of that country, particularly Art. 40 
(the "right to strike so long as it is exercised within the law provisions aimed to govern it") and art. 3(2) 
(principle of equality), means that it can be categorised as "the absolute right of freedom for the defence 
of fundamental interests of the human being." (A Vallebona, op. ult. cit. 250) 
See more extensively Chapter 5 infra. 
11 Among the others, see more recently M Sargeant and D Lewis, Employment Law (6th edn Pearson 
2012) 359, 366 and A Emir, Selwyn's Law of Employment (17th edn Oxford University Press 2012) 
641,643. 
12 See Chapter 3 infra.  
13 International Transport Workers Federation v Viking Line [2008] All ER (EC) 127 (Case C-438/05). 
The ECJ, in this specific case, held that the union organising the strike, because of the decision of the 
employer to relocate its activities from one Member to another, was against the employer's right to 
freedom of establishment pursuant to what was that time Art. 43 of the EC Treaty. Therefore the union 
might have had a right to strike, so long as this would not have restricted the employer's movement rights.  
14 Cfr. ACL Davies, ‘One step forward, two steps back? The Viking and Laval cases in the ECJ’ (2008) 
37 ILJ 126. 
It is well known that the “Viking” decision follows the wake of “Albany” (Case C-67/96 Albany 
International BV v Stichting Bedrijfpensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751, para 54), where 
the stances of the Court leaning on the recognition of a right to strike were even more tenuous, as 
basically hinged exclusively on the statement of the Advocate General Jacobs.    
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its essence, might “restrict in future, rather than facilitate, the industrial action”15. In 
fact, the matter still remains debatable and in evolution in this respect; at judicial level, 
the further cases of “Rüffert”16 and “Luxembourg”17, more recently ripened and where 
the principle of the territorial effect of the national legislation is somehow undermined18 
,may corroborate the view that a recognition of social rights, ergo the right to strike, is 
far from being a consolidated trend on the part of the Court, despite the widespread but 
not totally grounded criticism of the Scholar. In fact, the Court, in somehow hinting at 
such a right - whose existence at legislative level, at least from the humble perspective 
of this work, is far from being demonstrated on purely legal grounds19-, does recognise 
that the right to the collecting bargaining, as well as that to strike, may be subject, in 
some circumstances, to those limits required under specific rights – particularly 
economic rights – established in the Treaty.20  
In addition to this, the same Chapter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union does 
little to throw any further light on the matter; in detail, art. 28, in requiring each 
Member State to recognise the right of both the workers and employers to collective 
action in cases of conflicts of interest might somehow include the strike of the 
employees, although it is clearly added – quoad erat demonstrandum – that it must be 
clearly exercised “in accordance with Community law and national law and practices.”21 
In a work whose purpose is to analyse from a comparative perspective two different 
jurisdictions in connection to the same concept (the right to strike), a more contentious 
element is the opt-out regime that (mainly if not exclusively) Britain has exercised, in 
force of Protocol 30 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union as regards 
the Chapter. Theoretically, the result of this derogation, partly applicable to Poland, 
would be the fundamental immunity of the UK national legislation in respect of matters 
contained in the Chapter, unless it relates to areas already contained in UK national 
                                                 
15 ACL Davies, Perspectives on Labour Law (2nd edn Cambridge University Press 2009) 228. 
16 Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] IRLR 467. 
17 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2009] IRLR 388. 
18 S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law (6th edn Hart Publishing 2012) 109. See also F Vecchio,'Dopo 
Viking, Laval e Rüffert: verso una Nuova Composizione tra Libertà Economiche Europee e Diritti Sociali 
Fondamentali?' in http://www.europeanrights.eu/index.php?funzione=S&op=5&id=480.  
19 Admittedly, what propounded under this work, quite sceptical towards any too much idealistic 
interpretation of rights not clearly recognised at legislative level, may appear isolated, doctrinally. For 
example, see: F Vecchio (n 18) 1,13; P Syrpis and T Novitz, 'Economic and Social Rights in Conflict: 
Political and Judicial Approaches to their Reconciliation' 2008 33(3) European Law Review 411,426; T 
Novitz, 'Taking Industrial Action' 2008 7(4) Comp. L I 10,12).  
See also: U Carabelli, 'Il Contrasto tra le Libertà Economiche Fondamentali e i Diritti di Sciopero e di 
Contrattazione Collettiva nella Recente Giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia: il Sostrato Ideologico e le 
Implicazioni Giuridiche del Principio di Equivalenza Gerarchica' 2011(2) Studi sull'Integrazione Europea 
217; D Comandè, il Diritto di Negoziazione Collettiva cede il passo alle Norme Europee sugli Appalti 
Pubblici: quale Compromesso è sostenibile' 2011(3) Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro 903; S 
Giubboni, 'Dopo Viking, Laval e Rüffert: in cerca di un nuovo Equilibrio tra Diritti Sociali e Mercato, in 
A Andreoni and B Veneziani (eds), Libertà Economiche e Diritti Sociali nell'Unione Europea (Ediesse 
2009) 121. 
20 E Ales and T Novitz, 'Collective Action and Fundamental Freedoms in Europe: Striking the Balance' 
2011 40(1) ILJ 108,111, particularly in commenting on "Laval" and "Viking". 
21 S Deakin & GS Morris, Labour Law (5th edn n 4) 892. 
It is well known that there is an entrenched attitude of the ECJ to use both this piece of legislation and art. 
153(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU with generosity in order “to give content to the notion 
of ‘general principles’ of the EU law” (Case C-173/99 BECTU v Secretary of State for trade and Industry 
[2001] ECR I-4881, as recalled in S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law (6th edn n 18) 108). 
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laws.22 More practically, because some rights contained in art. 28 of the Chapter had 
already been elevated to general principles of the EU by the ECJ, the derogation under 
Protocol 30, “would appear to be of political or symbolic, rather than legal, 
significance.”23    
Finally, in respect to the liaison between the British legislation in the matter of 
industrial action and a further but different legislative over-layer (the European 
Convention of Human Rights),24 the possible interpretation of the right to strike as 
inferable from the principle under Art. 11(1) of that framework, where in reality a mere 
right of association is recognised, has been quashed - unceremoniously but probably on 
serious legal grounds - by the British domestic courts. The decision in National Union 
of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers v Serco 25 bears recent testament to lack of 
room to manoeuvre, although – admittedly – an opposing view expressed by the same 
European Court of Human Rights in Demir v Turkey26 could offer a prospective 
intellectual inspiration for the national courts of some countries (seemingly not the UK) 
in the years to come. In this respect, although the position of the UK, for some reason 
quite isolated in the Continent, seems to be legally justified, the impression the 
interpreter can get, particularly in contrasting Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden27 with 
the above mentioned “Demir”,28 is that the political logic tends to prevail on the legal 
one, in the same fashion as that emphasised earlier on in describing the evolution of the 
other judicial body (the ECJ)29. 
 
 
                                                 
22 For details of the outcome of the opt-out at stake, see S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law (6th edn n 
18) 111. 
23 S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law (6th edn n 18) 112. 
24 Remarkably, art. 6 of the Treaty of the European Union stipulates that the fundamental rights of the 
ECHR are de iure “general principles” of the EU.  
25 National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers v Serco Ltd (t/a Serco Docklands) [2011] IRLR 
399. A pendant of “National Union” could be Ministry of Justice v Prison Officers Association [2008] 
ICR 702. 
In “National Union” Elias LJ stated: «[..]. The [domestic] legislation should simply be construed in the 
normal way, without presumptions one way or the other. The starting point should be that the 1992 Act 
should be given a likely and workable construction». 
26 (34503/97) [2009] I.R.L.R. 766 (12 November 2008). In this court decision, art. 11 is explicitly evoked, 
for the first time, as a possible avenue to justify the right to strike. In this respect, see: H Collins, 'The 
Protection of Civil Liberties in the Workplace' 2006(69) Modern Law Review 619; A Emir (n 11) 37. 
27[1978] E.C.C. 17 (6 February 1976). 
28 In more general terms, the entrenched topic of the "dichotomy and parenthood" existing between social 
rights and human rights is dissected, among the others, in H Collins, 'Theories of Rights as Justifications 
for Labour Law', in G Davidov and B Langille (eds), The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press 
2011) 137; G Kolben, 'Labour Rights as Human Rights' 2010(50) Virginia Journal of International Law 
449.  
A justified criticism towards the "alchemy" of the court to turn into obligations against States non-binding 
frameworks, particularly the recommendations of the ILO, is expressed by A Perulli, 'Globalizzazione e 
Dumping Sociale: quali Rimedi?' 2011(1) Lavoro e Diritto 33. 
29 The threat posed by a ius positum bestowed upon the discretionary, unpredictable and mutable 
decisions of the ECHR, is properly dissected by some commentators (see, among others, V Brino, 'La 
Giurisprudenza degli Organi di Controllo OIL ed il Dialogo Virtuoso con la Corte di Strasburgo' in S 
Borrelli, A Guazzarotti and S Lorenzoni (eds), I Diritti dei Lavoratori nelle Carte Europee dei Diritti 
Fondamentali (Jovene 2012). 
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The “immunity” under the British statute 
 
In this scenario, Britain is frequently accused of offering only limited protection to 
employees who engage in strike action, from a statutory point of view. In itself, the 
inducement (by a trade union) to abstain from work and therefore break the contract of 
employment30 would spark off a liability in tort, unless the legislator did not provide for 
specific immunities, as it does accord at s 219 of the TULR(C)A 1992.31   
The long-established common law stance is reflected in the case of Lumley v Gye32 and 
in its eloquent narrative, which addressed the act of inducing a breach of contract. It was 
eventually held that the claimant - an employer - could successfully sue the defendant - 
a third party – because the latter was inducing an employee (in this case, an opera 
singer) to break the contract.33 The concept has been further elaborated upon in Allen v 
Flood34 ,whose ratio decidendi was that unlawfulness is a further condition which must 
be met, in addition to the intention to harm, for such a liability in tort to arise. As a 
result of this, and still from a common law perspective, it is worth noting that trade 
unions would face claims for damages – as well as an interim injunction to halt the 
action – from two potentially injured parties. An action could be raised firstly by the 
employers and secondly by any other person, extraneous to the employer-employee 
contractual relationship, that might have suffered a loss as a result of the unlawful 
action.35  
Thus, within such rigorous legal confines, there can be little room for doubt – and from 
a domestic perspective this is fundamentally trite law - that the British trade dispute is 
ordered to march along a regimented and closely marshalled perimeter where the terms 
are set in stone, those being that the dispute must be - firstly - exclusively one between 
workers and employers.36  
Secondly, the industrial action must relate wholly, or at least predominantly, to the 
overarching objective of “collective bargaining”, as per the legislative definition more 
recently laid out under the TULR(C)A37, specifically under s 244(1)38. Admittedly, this 
                                                 
30 Further hypotheses, de relato, would be those set forth under s 219 of the TULR(C)A 1992. See in this 
respect the explanations of S Honeyball, Honeyball & Bowers' Textbook on Employment Law (12th edn 
Oxford University Press 2012) 401.   
31 See, doctrinally, H Collins, Employment Law (Oxford University Press 2003) 148.  
32(1853) 2 E&B 216. 
33 The rationale behind Lumley v Gye is reiterated in the case of Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins [1969] 
IRLR 331 where it was held that a union official could be constrained by an injunction so as not to induce 
a fuel supplier to breach its contract to supply oil. It is correctly emphasised by scholars (S Deakin and 
GS Morris, Labour Law (5th edn n 4) 903) that such a liability has expanded more recently insofar as to 
encompass the inducement to breach a statutory duty as well as to breach an equitable obligation. 
34 [1898] AC 1. For an extensive comment, see S Deakin and GS Morris, Labour Law (5th edn n 4) 
889,1008, particularly 899,900. 
35 This is reflected in the dictum Torquay Hotel Co Ltd v Cousins (n 21). 
It is properly affirmed (M Sargeant and D Lewis (n 11) 361) that this court decision expands the principle 
of Lord Denning MR in Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495, according to which "it is a violation of legal 
right to interfere with contractual relations recognised by law if there be no sufficient justification for this 
interference."  
36 It is s 218 of TULR(C)A that clarifies the unique concept of the dispute as being a "matter" between 
workers and their employer, therefore the two parties between which the contractual relationship subsists.  
37 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, henceforth the TULR(C)A 1992. 
38 It is worth paraphrasing the tenor of the law provision: "A dispute between workers and their employers 
which relates wholly or mainly to one or more of the following:  
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requirement is not so simple to decipher, since it may prove troublesome to assess the 
causation link existing between the industrial action and the areas specified in the 
legislation and therefore deemed “protected”. In all likelihood, in dealing with an 
industrial action in the public sector, the matter would turn out to be inherently more 
straight-forward as the demarcation line existing between a dispute which is politically 
motivated and one which is “genuinely” economic would appear to be decidedly 
evanescent, given the “public” nature of the entity in charge of paying the 
remuneration.39 More recently, the cases of Unison v Westminster County Council40 and 
University College London Hospitals NHS Trust v Unison41 may have clarified the gist 
of a trade dispute “protected” for the purposes of the British legislation. Particularly, in 
“University College London”, the injunction requested by the employer was granted as, 
it was held, the dispute merely related to a prospective employer (a consortium 
favourable to the unions because, in contracting the services of the hospital, it would 
hire the employees previous engaged with the hospital) rather than the current 
employer. In other words, the dispute did not fall within the meaning of s 244 of the 
TULR(C)A 1992. 
Thirdly and finally, in order that the industrial action be rendered lawful, it must be 
taken “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute” as illustrated in Bent’s 
Brewery Ltd v Hogan42, with the politically motivated trade dispute therefore existing 
outwith the legal safeguard of the “protected trade dispute”43. In this latter respect, the 
British legislator, in adopting this “formula” as early as 1992, has clearly encapsulated 
the ratio decidendi underpinning landmark cases, such as BBC v Hearn44.  
 
 
Recent British authorities in the matter of industrial action 
(“Metrobus” and “British Airways”) 
 
As far as the modalities of the strike are concerned, in Britain the trade dispute is not 
protected if it is not preceded by a ballot. This is clearly prescribed under the 
TULR(C)A, at s 226, which reads as follows: «An act done by a trade union to induce a 
person to take part, or continue to take part, in industrial action [..] is not protected 
unless the industrial action has the support of a ballot [...]» 
The subsequent section (s 227) clarifies that the right to strike in the ballot is conferred 
exclusively on the members of any participating trade unions and only so long as it is 
reasonable that those members take part in the industrial action at stake. 
                                                 
(a) terms and conditions of employment, or the physical conditions in which any workers are 
required to work; [omissis]”. 
39 In actual terms, the political decisions of the government as "employer" sometimes affect the terms of 
conditions of employment.  
40 [2001] EWCA Civ 443. 
41 [1999] ICR 204.  
42 (1945) 2 AII ER 570.  
There belongs to the same school of thought Conway v Wade (1908) 24 TLR 604 with relevant narrative, 
when a union official informed employees that there would be a strike unless a worker was dismissed; 
however, the union official did this to try to get the worker fined. It was held that although the dispute 
existed, the act was not done in furtherance of the dispute.   
43 Among scholars, A Emir (n 11) 647. 
44 (1978) 1 AII ER 111. 
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From an empirical point of view, a certain degree of criticism must be voiced with 
regard to the judicial attitude directed more recently towards some provisions of the 
legislation under discussion, particularly those enshrined within the TULR(C)A, 
although in broad terms the British legislation in the matter of the strike, as 
encompassed by the TULR(C)A, seems to demonstrate a fair and balanced statutory 
recourse. In this respect, the discussion may well go beyond the Channel so as to 
embrace the common law systems lato sensu considered.  
In Britain, the legal case of “Metrobus”,45 where an interlocutory injunction was 
generously granted to the employers to stop what would have otherwise been an 
inevitable and lawfully organised strike,46 is telling in its augmentation of a trend; yet, it 
represents a partial departure from the decision in “British Airways”,47 where the 
principle conveyed by the court was that a minor infringement (in this case the 
announcement of an imminent strike by the Unions via text and email, rather than via 
Royal Mail correspondence) could not affect the legality of the process. Despite the 
more recent judicial developments, “Metrobus” would appear to be a bête noire which 
continues to exert considerable influence over the concept of strike action in Britain. In 
this respect, attention should be drawn to the fact that “British Airways” case marks 
merely a Pyrrhic victory for the unions, as the principle of law favourable to the 
employees (ie the strike not preventable by the employer on the grounds of minor 
infringements) was only successful at the climactic stage of proceedings (vis-a'-vis the 
Court of Appeal), whereas at the commencement of the dispute (interlocutory stage) the 
employer had already de facto succeeded in stopping the initiative48 .The “return to the 
common sense” of the judiciary system, as so eloquently articulated by a scholar,49 and 
not without plausible logical justification, seems to be confirmed by the case of NURMT 
(National Union of Rail Maritime and Transport Workers v SERCO Ltd (t/a Serco 
Docklands)50 where it was held that the invalidation of a ballot is the extrema ratio 
whereas the ordinary approach by the court, to be invoked in cases of minor 
infringements, is the de minimis principle.    
The aforementioned cases taken together, although with particular reference to “British 
Airways” at first hearing where the strike was clearly blocked by the judicial body 
based exclusively on a legal and indeed formal stratagem, demonstrate that Britain may 
offer a sanctuary from strike action tantamount to the Trojan walls under siege from the 
Greeks, ostensibly strong but susceptible to being bridged, or rather circumvented, by 
way of tricks and legal artifices, and with a timing of such speed and agility that 
Achilles' feat in breaching “Priam's fortress” would pale into insignificance.  
                                                 
45 Metrobus v Unite the Union [2009] EWCA Civ 829.  
46 The infringement was, based on the motivation of the court decision, both a defect in the information 
contained in the ballot papers and irregularities in the name of those going on strike, provided to the 
employer. Tangentially, it was also observed that the unions had communicated the strike to the employer 
with 48 hour delay, although in reality s 231A of the TULR(C)A mentions more generically the wording 
"as soon as reasonably practicable" .  
47 British Airways v Unite the Union [2010] EWCA Civ 669. Among the textbooks, a description of these 
two cases ("Metrobus" and "British Airways") may be read in G Pitt, Employment Law (8th edn Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011) 423,424; S Taylor and A Emir, Employment Law An introduction (3rd edn OUP 2012) 
582,583. 
48 For the factual circumstances of that dispute, it is worth remembering that the "British Airways" strike 
should have taken place in coincidence with the Christmas holiday 2010/2011, causing therefore mayhem 
and carnage across the skies of Europe. 
49 G Pitt (n 37) 427. 
50 [2011] EWCA Civ 226. 
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In drawing this Chapter to its conclusion, it is clear that the limitations placed upon 
strike action are quite strongly defined in British legislation, under a rigorous and 
precise set of norms. However, to further truncate the entitlements of employees - based 
on interpretations of the relevant courts which can be deemed arguable and doubtful 
(from a legal point of view) as well as mischievous (from an economic perspective) and 
through motivations that are hardly justified de iure - would seem to be too quick a step 
towards, ultimately, a denial of the same ratio essendi of the “immunity”. Interestingly, 
de iure condendo, therefore in considering amendments to the current legislative 
scenario in Britain in this matter, there may be room, as is the case in Italy51, for law 
provisions impeding the trade unions from instigating strike action or, better still, from 
staging trade disputes during “protected periods”, such as Christmas, Easter and other 
specified holidays. Thus, the strike, in itself legitimate, would be prevented from taking 
place, albeit having satisfied the balloting requirements, given the widespread damage 
which it would wreak on a vulnerable public.  
Conversely, the idea put forward by some British scholars, particularly in the wake of 
“Metrobus”, suggesting that the strike “made in Britain” should be radically reformed52 
does not appear particularly persuasive. In reality, as hopefully demonstrated in this 
work, the structure of the TULR(C)A seems to have played a significant hand in the 
comparatively steady wealth accumulated and economic prosperity enjoyed over recent 
decades in Britain, especially when compared with economies where a rather loose 
approach to tackling strikes taken by the respective incumbent legislators has meant that 
any form of business is really problematic53. 
 
The scenario across the Continent 
 
The finalities of the strike in Italy 
 
Based on the black letter of the legislation applicable in this area, strike action in Italy 
should have been simply “economic” in the same fashion as its British counterpart.  
At doctrinal level this is recognised by scholars when they affirm: «The strike in a 
traditional sense is the economic one for contractual purposes, aimed to achieve an 
improvement of the work conditions»54. 
                                                 
51 See Chapter 5 infra, particularly 5.2. See P Pascucci, Tecniche Regolative dello Sciopero nei Servizi 
Pubblici Essenziali, Utet 1999); A Vallebona, Le Regole dello Sciopero nei Servizi Pubblici Essenziali 
(Giappichelli 2007). 
52 It has been suggested (J Prassl, 'To strike, to serve? Industrial action at British Airways. British Airways 
plc v Unite the Union (Nos 1 and 2)' 2011 40(1) ILJ 91) that "[..] the detailed and rigid drafting of its 
formality provisions can in effect be invoked by the employer to precisely the opposite effect". See also R 
Duke, R. ‘The Right to Strike under UK Law: Not Much More than a Slogan?’ 2010 39(1) ILJ 82,91). 
It may be well counterclaimed that in reality, as the "yardstick Italy" teaches, the problem is not the 
method (the too many formalities affecting the procedures), rather some loopholes that the legislator has 
left in terms of legislation. This gap can be filled not via a reform or a revolution of the TULR(C)A, as 
alleged, rather through an adjustment of the wording of the law provisions currently in force. For 
instance, as suggested in this work, the provisions that some periods of time, not coincidentally the easy 
target by the trade unions (eg Christmas), are crucial in some specific sectors (eg transportation) and 
cannot be affected by strikes.  
53 See following Chapter, with the example of Italy. 
54 Namely: “Lo sciopero in senso tradizionale è quello economico a fini contrattuali, diretto ad ottenere 
un miglioramento delle condizioni di lavoro”. A Vallebona, Istituzioni di Diritto del Lavoro vol I Il 
Diritto Sindacale (n 10) 267.  
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This statement is coupled with the assertion that in Italy, just as in any logically 
developed jurisdiction, the “recipient” of the strike is the employer (at the other end of 
the contractual spectrum from the employee). Thus, there should not be any reason for a 
strike to be “infused” with motivations of a different or further variety, i.e. political. It is 
obvious that political strike action does not have any connection with the contractual 
relationship existing between employer and employee; ergo the political strike is 
theoretically not sanctioned.  
However, as the result of a very broad interpretation of the Italian constitution 
advocated by the same Italian constitutional court, it is a well-established concept in 
that country that the “political” strike must also be deemed to be legal. More 
specifically, the reasoning adopted by the highest judicial body in Italy in its entrenched 
and perpetually endorsed rulings55 is that the economic-political strike, for claims raised 
against public bodies including the government and representing, as it does, the vast 
spectrum of interests held by employees56, must be considered legal. In this respect, the 
explanation of the constitutional court is that the different rights set forth in that specific 
part of the Italian constitution are conferred on individuals as employees. 
As a result of this, in Italy a long-standing equation has been drawn de facto between 
economic-contractual industrial action57 (which is likewise recognised in the UK) and 
economic-political58 industrial action (totally illegal in the UK). The latter then is a 
strike to which the employer may be – and so often is – subjected to industrial action 
not because any wrongdoing has been claimed by employees against him, but simply 
because he ends up being the unwanted third party ensnared in a dispute which is, in 
reality, between the employees and a public body, for instance the government. 
To further endanger the prospects of businesses operating in Italy, it is worth noting that 
the Constitutional Court has gone yet further in its judgements by recognising, during 
the '70s, the legitimacy of purely political strike action, thereby giving legal footing to a 
strike which is not, directly or indirectly, connected to the economic conditions, but 
whose purpose is exclusively to protest against authority59. 
From a contractual point of view, the outcome of these judgements emanating from the 
Italian Constitutional Court gives rise to a certain degree of legal aberration. The 
“party” entirely extraneous to the subject of the political or economic-political strike 
                                                 
See also M Biagi with M Tiraboschi, Istituzioni di Diritto del Lavoro (5th edn Giuffre’ Editore Milan 
2012) passim.  
55 Constitutional Court, 28th December 1962, n. 123; Constitutional Court, 15th December 1967, n. 141; 
Constitutional Court, 14th January 1974, n. 1.  
56 In other words, the interests and rights bestowed upon employees in the part of the Italian Constitution 
concerned with the “economic relations”, namely title (titolo) III of the first part (parte uno), more 
specifically the articles encompassed by from 35 until 47. 
57 Sciopero economico a fini contrattuali. As regards the strike for contractual reasons, G Branca, 
‘Riflessioni sullo Sciopero Economico’ 1968(I) Rivista di Diritto Civile 151.  
58 “Sciopero economico-politico”, to use the Italian terminology. This would be a strike that is directly 
political but indirectly economic, as the result of the industrial action is to get either the government or 
the public authority to change a policy or a direction so that employees may benefit from it, in their own 
collective agreements. See, among the others, P Calamandrei, 'Significato Costituzionale del Diritto di 
Sciopero' 1952(I) Rivista di Giurisprudenza del Lavoro 221; F Santoro Passarelli, Nozioni di Diritto del 
Lavoro (ESI 1994); on the history (in Italy) of the right to strike, G Neppi Modona, Sciopero, Potere 
Politico e Magistratura, 1870-1922 (Cacucci 1969); R Nania, Sciopero e Sistema Costituzionale (Utet 
1995). 
59 Constitutional Court, 27th December 1974, n. 290. As a result of this, the British case BBC v Hearn 
would be, mutatis mutandis, totally legal in Italy, whereas it is quite clear that conclusions would be 
different in the UK.  
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(the employer) ends up bearing the brunt of a contractual breach of obligations 
exercised by his own employees, bereft of any obvious motive of the strike being traced 
back to him, either directly or indirectly.  
Not only: the decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court in the ’60s and ’70s, in 
sanctioning any unfettered form of strike action including those of a political nature, 
appear to have been based, quite arguably, on a very broad interpretation of a principle 
allegedly contained in the Italian constitution (art. 40), whose black letter simply 
affirms that the right to strike is exercised within the laws governing it60. It is quite clear 
and logical that, based on the tenor of this law provision, the strike should have been 
subjected to a law (therefore, not to be exercised in the absence of specific legislation), 
rather than given over to the “creative” interpretation of the “local” constitutional court. 
This latter digression has, on the one hand, rendered the ordinary law, to which the 
strike should have been otherwise subject to, something merely to be tolerated in its 
absence while, on the other, the expression “right to strike” has been artificially 
“inflated” and therefore perceived, with unfettered intellectual enthusiasm but with dire 
consequences for business and foreign investors, as the “absolute” right to strike for 
various reasons (including for a purely political one) and without the backing of any 
statutory provision61. It is therefore mysterious just how the Italian Constitutional Court 
came to act so differently when dealing with apparently similar issues, on the one hand 
by blatantly turning a “blind eye” to the lack of legislation governing over strike action 
while, on the other, opening the floor to such speculative interpretations around the 
concept of the strike, so as to embrace the purely political form. 
Furthermore, it appears contradictory that the constitutional court in Italy has been so 
quick and enthusiastic to throw its weight behind the right to strike, manifested in 
entrenched and consolidated judgements and unburdened by limitations or boundaries, 
while showing scant regard for other rights which originate from the same constitutional 
chart and which are unduly affected by an expansion of the right to strike. In this 
respect, it is perhaps naïve to attach a literal reading to the reference in art. 41 of the 
Italian constitution where it is stated, in the opening paragraph, that private economic 
activity is free62. In comparing the two rights (the right to strike, on one hand, and the 
right to do business in a free market, on the other) in the most superficial and cursory 
way, it is clear that the balance between the two has been dramatically altered over 
recent years so as to render the latter all but neutralised, if not erased, as a result of the 
expansion of the former. 
 
Limits to the strike in Italy 
 
As alluded to above, the Italian constitution required the legislator, under ordinary law, 
to legislate over the right to strike. However, this constitutional right in Italy has never 
been legislated in its modalities, in stark contrast to British statutory advancements in 
                                                 
60 Namely: “Il diritto di sciopero si esercita nell'ambito delle leggi che lo regolano”. 
61 In Italy there is a very limited legislation in terms of strike, concerned with the industrial action 
affecting public service, for which a specific previous notice must be given, according to Law n. 146 of 
1990. Apart from this specific piece of legislation, no law provision limits and rules the strike. See again 
footnote 2 and also A Accornero, 'Conflitto, Terziario e Terzi' 1985 Giornale di Diritto del Lavoro e delle 
Relazioni Industriali 17; T Treu and Others, Sciopero e Servizi Essenziali (Cedam 1991); F Carinci, Lo 
Sciopero nei Servizi Pubblici Essenziali: dall'Autoregolamentazione alla l. N. 146/1990, 1990(I) Rivista 
di Giurisprudenza del Lavoro 13.  
62 Namely: “L’iniziativa economica privata è libera”. 
13 www.bollettinoadapt.it 
this regard, particularly in light of the law provisions enshrined within the TULRCA 
199263.  
The sole law in Italy which pertains to regulate and somehow limit strike action, albeit 
in a decidedly superficial manner, is law no. 146, enacted in 1990 and later amended, in 
2000, in force of law no. 83. Sadly, it must be acknowledged that the magnitude of this 
statute cannot be overemphasised, as it applies only to the “indispensable public 
services” (such as transport, hospitals and so on) and protects the consumer, while 
ironically refraining from extending the same “courtesy” to the employers!  
Also, the structure of the law opens it up to a great deal of criticism and reveals a quite 
clearly limited and humble ambit, as the rules of conduct imposed on the strikers are 
hardly exacting. The “basic” requirements include a previous notice; an obligation of 
written communication of the duration of the strike; the modalities of execution and the 
motivations64.Interestingly, the law establishes a body, commissione di garanzia, whose 
purpose is to carry out functions of moderation and conciliation in addition to levying 
sanctions, mainly against the unions, in cases where the limits of the law were 
exceeded. However, the legislation at stake still spectacularly fails to address the main 
issue plaguing industrial relations in Italy, that being the discretionary and undemocratic 
power bestowed upon the unions to call a strike, where no ballot is a condition for the 
relevant “immunities” to be bestowed upon the participants.65 No less important is the 
fact that the issue seems to be particularly aggravated in Italy as trade unionism in that 
country does not have to undergo a minimal process of certification, as is the situation 





The discussion conducted, by way of a comparison of two different legislations (British 
and Italian) with regard to the “ontology” of the strike67, seems to have arrived at some 
surprising conclusions. 
First and foremost, the Italian legislative system utilised for the purposes of comparison 
(with the British) appears to have been entirely manipulated over recent years by a 
rather too partial interpretation of the constitutional provisions of that country in the 
matter of the right to strike. The result has left industrial action in Italy unfettered by the 
reasonable limitations placed upon it in Britain, where strike action is restricted to an 
“economic” form, because the courts of the country of the “bel canto”, endorsed by the 
same local constitutional court, extended the concept of the strike so as to account for 
                                                 
63 Paradoxically, a country with no formal constitution like Britain has deeply and properly legislated in 
the matter of strike, whereas a jurisdiction like the Italian one with a constitution delegated to specific ad 
hoc regulations has never delivered the delegated piece of legislation.  
64 A Vallebona, Istituzioni di Diritto del Lavoro, vol I Il Diritto Sindacale (n 10) 275. 
65 N Selwyn's, Selwyn's Law of Employment (16th edn Oxford University Press 2011) 651. The A. 
emphasises that "[t]hre is no legal requirement which insists that a ballot be called by the union before 
industrial action be taken. However, a failure to do so will have [some consequences, such as the loss of 
the statutory immunity under s 219.]" Therefore the demarcation line in the modality of the strike 
between Italy and the UK appears significant. 
66 See above footnote 2 as well as, more recently, R Del Punta, Lo Sciopero in F. Carinci (ed), Il Lavoro 
Subordinato, Vol. I, Il Diritto Sindacale (Utet 2007). 
67 The present analysis has not extended, as it could have, to the proper “modalities” of the strike, 
therefore the ballot.  
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one of a purely “political” nature. It is possible to deduce from this observation that 
trade unions on the Continent – and Italy is the paradigm of this extremist approach – 
act more and more frequently purely out of political motivations, bereft of any 
democratic background and minus the control which exists in Britain, where unions are 
subject to certification. 
Secondly, in respect to the British approach to industrial action, it can be affirmed, 
thanks to the comparative analysis proposed in this work, that the system, in its current 
legislative form, continues to “work” efficiently, despite its “age” and sporadic criticism 
of doctrinal nature. Firstly, it strikes a reasonable balance between the two principle and 
contrasting interests on the table, the well-being of the employees, on one hand, and the 
right of an individual to do business on the other. Secondly, the modalities whereby the 
industrial action is required to be exercised seem to be respectful of the prerogatives of 
the trade unions, in a scenario where the rights of the members, through the democratic 
process a of ballot et similia, are nonetheless protected.  
From a British perspective, the only perplexity arising out of this brief but thorough 
examination of the British provisions for industrial action is the “attitude” of the 
“judiciary” towards the concept in discussion. The recent cases dissected in this work 
highlight the need for a more pondered and fair approach so that, ultimately, an 
imminent strike is not reduced to nothing more than farce; in this respect, the Metrobus 
case certainly and sadly docet! Yet, a “lifebelt” slung from Italian shores could 
surprisingly hold the key to addressing this unsavoury state of affairs. The provision in 
question, introduced in the Italian courts and ‘ripe’ for export to Britain, mutatis 
mutandis states that a strike action cannot be exercised in protected periods, particularly 
those coinciding with major festivities or national events. This would undoubtedly 
allow the British judiciary to unshackle itself from a persistent and detestable “legal 
contortionism” displayed more recently in its decisa, ie the search for legal stratagems 
and not totally plausible interpretations of the legislation in order to rule out strikes that, 
legally, appear above board but, de facto, due to their timing, inopportune. Conversely, 
the idea of a radical reform of the TULR(C)A, more recently considered in the agitated 
fallout from domestic judicial blunders, such as “Metrobus”, whose ultimate purpose 
would be to drift away from its same philosophy (the formality and legality in the steps 
conducive to the strike), would seem akin to negotiating a risky departure, through 
perilous waters and towards an unknown port.  
Thirdly, and from a constitutional law perspective, it is a worthy exercise to draw a 
parallel between the two jurisdictions at stake as regards the way a right (the right to 
strike) has been left unlegislated in Italy in its modalities, although the local constitution 
required to this to be carried out68; contrasting with this is the more practical and 
measured approach of the British legislation, where paradoxically industrial action has 
been regulated in detail despite the United Kingdom having no recourse to a 
consolidated constitutional chart. From a wide-ranging perspective, the “story” narrated 
above seems to be a warning for future constitutional developments in Britain, for the 
reason that the “Italian job”, as regards the industrial action, may be an example of the 
many inextricable distortions a complex and articulated constitutional architecture may 
often give rise to69.To elaborate, and keeping in mind what happened in Italy, the 
presence of a constitution, conferring powers on constitutional bodies created ad hoc (in 
this specific case, the Italian constitution and the Italian constitutional court, 
                                                 
68 A fundamental piece of legislation (the constitution) not implemented in one of its major principles. 
69 The example is that of Italy, but the example could be replicated for other continental countries. 
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respectively), has produced an unclear set of rules which basically obstruct the right to 
do business (ironically enshrined in art. 40 of the same Italian constitution), whereas in 
Britain, despite (or thanks to!) the absence of traditional “constitutional pillars”, apart 
from its consolidated set of laconic constitutional laws, the legislator succeeded in 
creating a more efficient, clear and probably fair employer-employee relationship, with 
reasonable boundaries set particularly in the matter of industrial action. 
Furthermore, and with regard to the concept of the strike itself, so passionately 
deliberated over during the past three decades in its “ontology”70,the outcome of the 
analysis carried out in this work does not - and actually cannot – clarify which of the 
two doctrinally polarised approaches in place to explain the ratio essendi of the strike 
(laisser-faire versus idealistic),71 is the correct one. However, in all likelihood, the 
failure of the Italian model, a paradigm of the latter, relative to the performance of the 
British, encapsulating the essence of the former, seems to mark, if not an overarching 
triumph in war, at least a small victory of strategic importance for the “laisser-faire” 
approach72. Incidentally, the Italian interpretation of the strike, prompted and inflated by 
“revolutionary idealism” on the part of the judiciary (and the lesson could be learned 
also from the philosophy displayed in this matter by “international” courts, such as the 
ECJ and the ECHR!), may suggest that “idealism” in this matter is the source of trouble 
for an economy and, ultimately, for an entire country.  
More critically and speculatively, a question to be asked is whether in future a (new and 
proper) right to strike should be affirmed and legislated, at international level, with 
regard to the occurrence of a possible violation at work of equality matters (ie protected 
characteristics such as race, sexual orientation, sex). This new innovative concept of the 
right to strike, rather than the intellectually wearing and conceptually outdated one (the 
undemonstrated absolute right to strike connected to the abstention from work within 
the employer-employee dualism), could be the new “frontier” of industrial action and, in 
general terms, of the employment law discipline73.      
Finally, from a perspective which is no longer legal but purely economic, in a country 
like the UK, currently basking in its low rate public borrowing74, as opposed to a 
country (Italy) notoriously underperforming in terms of public finance virtuosity75 ,it 
would be somewhat intriguing to pose a question whether a causation link exists 
                                                 
70 See previous Chapter 2 supra. 
71 Freund-Kahn versus Ben-Israel, just to simplify the matter according to the relevant most representative 
supporters of each theory.  
72 In reality, reference could be made to a more vast scenario extended to non-EU countries, and infer that 
the laisser-faire approach has definitely "won the war", not simply the battle. Emerging countries such as 
the BRICS do not adopt a so accentuated concept of absolute right to strike, and not coincidentally their 
economies are currently booming.   
73 Obviously, because this proposal is adumbrated from scratch, without any literature supporting it, it is 
legitimate to self-define it as totally speculative, albeit logically justified.  
74 As opposed to the Italian one, with one of the worst public debt in the world.  
75 It is quite interesting to note that Italy, in the table of the world countries periodically assessed by the 
World Bank as regards the parameter of the ease of doing business, currently (2012) enjoys a non-
enviable 87th position, with 4 ranks lost in comparison to the previous year (see World Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Doing Business, Italy, passim, in 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/ITA.pdf, 
retrieved on May 21st May 2012). It is reasonable to infer that, if the criteria utilised for the purposes of 
the assessment (currently administrative burdens and bureaucratic constraints) had included the strike, 
currently not taken into account, the Italian rank would be even worse. In addition to this, Italy has been 
entrapped by an "explosive" public debt for at least 25 years, currently cruising towards the non-enviable 
figures of more than 120% of the GDP. 
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between these positive achievements on the former side of the Channel, and the 
legislative system therein employed in the matter of strike action and trade unions, a 
system left basically unchanged since the early ’90s, despite a succession of 
governments holding office in the interim76 .Of course, it would be too speculative to 
conclude that the sole reason for the positive results that Britain is today reaping in 
terms of public finances is per se entwined exclusively within the legislation of the 
TULR(C)A 1992 and its detailed blueprint on governing strike action. However, to 
sincerely regard the legislation promoted by the Conservative Government of that time 
and the battles fought by its incumbent Prime Minister as being a contributory factor is 
not simply an act of fairness, but one of moral necessity. Thus, in sowing the seeds 
which have contributed to a bountiful annual public finance harvest, one must give 
thanks in remembrance: suum cuique tribuere, to paraphrase the ancestors, or more 
prosaically, “God bless the Iron Lady”! 
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76 The statement could appear simplistic, from a standpoint of a historian of the trade unionism. However, 
as far as the legal structure of the industrial action is concerned, the statement can be hardly confuted. For 
in-depth analysis in the matter of the evolution of the industrial action in this matter, see P Davies and M 
Freeland, Towards a Flexible Labour Market (Oxford University Press 2007) passim.  
